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Introduction 
The theory of recognition is a paradigm shift in Frankfurt School critical theory. It builds on 
Habermas’ earlier shift from what he called a “philosophy of consciousness” to an 
intersubjective grounding of social criticism, but it departs from Habermas’ theories of 
communicative action and discourse ethics. Instead, it focuses on recognition relations that go 
beyond linguistically mediated communication to encompass affective attitudes, and on a 
dynamic conception of social struggles for recognition that makes sense of historical social 
struggles for equal rights and the recognition of marginalized contributions to socially shared 
goals. Looking forward, the theory of recognition helps critical theorists to evaluate 
“recognition orders” and to criticize social developments that fail to institutionalize recognitive 
relations that enable individual self-realisation. 
 
Needless to say, this is an ambitious project that depends on philosophical and empirical 
premises which can be contested, and on the articulation and defense of a complex 
philosophical vocabulary which is in need of clarification and extension. In this chapter I aim 
to offer an initial overview of the theory of recognition in the Frankfurt School tradition. I also 
discuss its sources and some conceptual questions that have been raised in the secondary 
literature. Then I turn to the aspect of Honneth’s theory that has received most attention, his 
account of the emergence of modern capitalism as a recognition order. I close with some 
remarks about future directions of research.  
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The theory of recognition first appears in Axel Honneth’s book, The Struggle for 
Recognition (1996 [1992]). Since then, Honneth has clarified his intentions and extended the 
scope of his theory in many publications, including his exchange with Nancy Fraser, 
Redistribution or Recognition? (Fraser and Honneth 2003), in which he introduces a number 
of important new concepts that extend the explanatory power of recognition. Most recently, 
Honneth has reconceived his project as a theory of social freedom. However, his extensive 
analysis of the development of social freedom in Freedom’s Right (2014 [2011]) still relies on 
the concept of recognition developed in his earlier work. Thus, the basic structure of 
recognition has remained unchanged. 
 
Honneth’s Theory of Recognition: A Bird’s-Eye View 
Honneth defends a “formal conception of ethical life” and derives the normative standards for 
social criticism from it (Honneth 1996: Ch. 9; Honneth 2003b: Sec. III). He arrives at his 
conception of ethical life through a phenomenology of historical struggles for recognition and 
against disrespect and humiliation. This phenomenology is informed by the social-theoretical 
conviction that “the reproduction of social life is governed by the imperative of mutual 
recognition” (Honneth 1996: 92). According to this phenomenology, the negative experience 
of disrespect and humiliation motivates struggles for recognition in which social groups stake 
their claims for the recognition of hitherto unrecognized or undervalued aspects of their 
members’ personalities, rights or contributions to social reproduction.  
 
This phenomenological analysis gives rise to a complex typology of recognition, which can 
be organized according to the dimension of personhood to which a particular mode of 
recognition is addressed, to the forms of recognition that are adequate to the particular 
dimension of personhood and to the social spheres in which the particular forms of recognition 
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have been historically institutionalized (Honneth 1996: 129; Honneth 2003a: 138–44). Thus, 
according to Honneth, subjects must be recognized in their singularity as possessors of needs 
and emotions, as autonomous agents with moral responsibility, and as possessors of particular 
traits and abilities that enable them to contribute to social cooperation (Ikäheimo 2002). The 
forms of recognition adequate to these dimensions of personhood are love (or friendship), 
respect and social esteem. And, historically speaking, modern capitalist societies have 
institutionalized these forms of recognition in the bourgeois family, the various legal and 
political institutions guaranteeing equality before the law and in the industrially organized 
division of labour respectively.  
 
To be sure, the historical institutionalization of these forms of recognition has been 
imperfect. In particular, the “achievement principle” (Honneth 2003a: 143) that provides the 
normative standard for the distribution of social esteem in modern capitalist societies embodies 
the ideological self-understanding of the “independent, middle-class, male bourgeois” 
(Honneth 2003a: 141), whose economic activity as an entrepreneur or professional becomes 
identified with individual achievement per se, while the specific achievements of dependent 
working-class labourers and women performing household work or raising children have only 
come to be recognized “with many class- and gender-specific delays” (Honneth 2003a: 142). 
But the decisive claim of the recognition-theoretical view is that in modern capitalist societies 
the principles of affective care, equal treatment and individual achievement provide the 
normative framework against which subjects judge the legitimacy of their social and political 
institutions as well as any existing social inequality (Honneth 2003a: 148–49).   
 
At this stage in the argument Honneth shifts perspective from a social theory of recognition 
relations to a normative theory of social justice. He argues that “[b]ecause we live in a social 
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order in which individuals owe the possibility of an intact identity to affective care, equality 
and social esteem, it seems…appropriate, in the name of individual autonomy, to make the 
three corresponding recognition principles the normative core of a conception of social justice” 
(Honneth 2003a: 181–82). In other words, mutual recognition in the three dimensions of 
personhood is a condition of possibility for individual autonomy, and, therefore, for self-
realization, because the development of a positive self-relationship, including the development 
of self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem, depends upon this recognition (Honneth 1996: 
173–74). Taken together, these requirements specify Honneth’s formal conception of the good 
life, because mutual recognition “provide[s] the intersubjective protection that safeguards the 
conditions for external and internal freedom, upon which the process of articulating and 
realizing individual life-goals without coercion depends” (Honneth 1996: 174).  
 
Moreover, the application of these principles of justice is future-directed: the social justice 
obtaining in a society is proportionate to the moral quality of the social relations of recognition. 
Here, Honneth offers two criteria for progress in the relations of recognition. Social recognition 
increases through individualization and inclusion, where individualization means that 
individuals gain social recognition for more aspects of their personalities, and inclusion means 
that more individuals are fully recognized in society (Honneth 2003a: 184–86). Underlying 
this conception of moral progress is the idea that the principles of recognition possess a “surplus 
of validity” (Honneth 2003a: 186) that transcends their current employment and that can be 
appealed to in struggles for recognition. This is particularly clear in the sphere of modern law, 
where the scope of equality has broadened significantly over the last few decades, but it is less 
clear where the spheres of love and social esteem are concerned. However, Honneth suggests 
that the overcoming of stereotypes and the extension of the category of esteemed activity 
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beyond the traditional conception of “gainful employment” may be examples of moral progress 
in these spheres (Honneth 2003a: 188).  
 
Taken together, Honneth’s critical theory of recognition offers two normative criteria for 
the evaluation of social institutions and practices. On the one hand, his formal conception of 
ethical life specifies the intersubjective preconditions of individual autonomy and self-
realization that must be protected in any modern democratic state. On the other hand, his 
conception of moral progress through increasing individualization and inclusion enables 
Honneth to reconstruct the rationality of historical struggles for recognition, and to diagnose 
social potentials for further individualization and inclusion, which will afford more individuals 
the opportunity to live flourishing ethical lives, as well as the structural impediments that 
prevent them from happening.  
 
In Freedom’s Right Honneth offers a third criterion of evaluation: social institutions and 
practices will be legitimate in the eyes of modern subjects to the extent that they enable them 
to realize their social freedom, that is, a form of freedom in which individuals complement and 
complete each other. Social freedom requires that the social institutions in which people act 
are free in the sense that they enable people to realize their freedom in cooperation with others 
who share their aims. Rather than a departure from recognition, it is a form of it. As Honneth 
puts it, social freedom can be understood as “the reciprocal experience of seeing ourselves 
confirmed in the desires and aims of the other, because the other’s existence represents a 
condition for fulfilling our own desires and aims” (Honneth 2014: 44–45), and that is a 




Sources of the Theory of Recognition 
The theory of recognition has its philosophical roots in the Hegel. In The Struggle for 
Recognition Honneth argues that Hegel’s original idea in his earliest work combines an 
intersubjectivist conception of human identity with the distinction of various media of 
recognition (love, law, solidarity), and a historically productive role for moral struggles for 
intersubjective recognition (Honneth 1996: 63). While Honneth had argued originally that 
these insights are occluded in Hegel’s work from the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) onwards 
and never occupy a systematic role in his philosophy again, in his more recent work Honneth 
finds a systematic place for recognition even in Hegel’s later work (Honneth 2010a). This 
motivates his re-actualization of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1821) in Freedom’s Right, where 
Honneth explicitly defends Hegel’s distinction of three spheres of social recognition, although 
he specifies these spheres differently, giving much greater weight than Hegel to deliberative 
will formation in a democratic public sphere.  
 
In addition to these philosophical roots, Honneth’s theory of recognition also is based on 
insights from social psychology, psychoanalysis, and developmental psychology. Like 
Habermas, in The Struggle for Recognition Honneth draws on George Herbert Mead in order 
to show that individuation occurs through socialization, but he focuses on the mutual attribution 
of recognitive status. Likewise, he draws on the psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott in order to 
demonstrate that the strong affective relationship between young infants and their carers is best 
understood as a relationship of mutual recognition which enables the infant to develop a sense 
of itself and its needs. More recently, Honneth also has drawn on the developmental 
psychology of Michael Tomasello in order bolster his argument about the primacy of 
intersubjectivity (Honneth 2005).  
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Finally, since The Struggle for Recognition aims to elucidate “the moral grammar of social 
conflicts” (so its subtitle), Honneth also uses historical studies that explicate the moral self-
understanding of individuals and collectives that engaged in various social struggles. For 
example, he finds support for his arguments in the works of the English social historian E.P. 
Thompson and the American political scientist Barrington Moore. Thompson had shown that 
social resistance to capitalist modernization often is the response to the disappointment of 
moral expectations based on a tacit social contract between classes, rather than a spontaneous 
reaction to deprivation or hardship. Moore had built on these insights and demonstrated that 
the moral injury experienced by members of activist groups in social uprisings often was one 
of disrespect, based on the breakdown of a traditional system of mutual recognition and a 
consequent loss of self-worth (Honneth 1996: 166–67). These historical studies have remained 
central to Honneth’s understanding of recognition struggles throughout his work, as he has 
generalized their conclusions and used them to illustrate more recent struggles (Honneth 2003a: 
131; see also Honneth 2014: 208–10). 
 
Conceptual Questions  
Clearly, a critical theory as ambitious and eclectic as this is open to a number of critical 
questions. Here are three common ones. To begin with, one may ask whether Honneth’s 
reliance on a conception of ethical life, albeit a formal one, commits him to a philosophical 
anthropology that will open him up to criticism from those who eschew such commitments 
(Zurn 2000:115–24). In response, Honneth clearly remains committed to philosophical 
anthropology as a foundation for critical theory (Honneth 2007a, 2008). However, his formal 
conception of ethical life is grounded in a weak philosophical anthropology. While the need 
for mutual recognition is an “anthropological constant” (Honneth 2003a: 174), the concrete 
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forms of recognition that are necessary for the achievement of self-realization change over time 
and are therefore historically specific (Honneth 2003a: 181).  
 
As we have seen, the theory of recognition is based on insights from social psychology, 
psychoanalysis, and developmental psychology. This may allay some worries about Honneth’s 
commitments to philosophical anthropology, but the use of these empirical insights does raise 
difficulties of its own. In particular, critics have suggested that Honneth’s use of Winnicott’s 
object-relations account of infant development, which enables him to conceptualize the 
relationship between the infant and its primary caregiver as a form of mutual recognition based 
on unconditional love, downplays the conflictual elements of this relationship in favor of a 
mutualistic one (for an excellent discussion of these issues see Petherbridge 2013: Ch. 9). 
 
Another important question is whether recognition should be understood on the model of 
attribution or perception (Ikäheimo 2002; Laitinen 2002). Thus, according to Honneth, the 
second form of recognition is respect for autonomous agency and moral responsibility. But it 
is not immediately clear whether a recognitive attitude of respect toward a person attributes 
autonomous agency and moral responsibility to the person, or whether it perceives that the 
person is an autonomous agent with moral responsibility and responds accordingly. On the face 
of it, both of these alternatives have their problems. If recognition attributes moral status to 
people, we lack an internal criterion for the attribution of positive qualities to a subject. 
Recognition may seem arbitrary, rather than responsive to the person recognized. What makes 
people autonomous and responsible seems to be more than the fact that we see them so. Does 
a person lack human dignity, if they are not recognized has possessing it? But if recognition 
perceives moral status, we must presuppose a conception of value realism that Honneth finds 
problematic, and it is not clear how much work the recognitive attitude does. Why is 
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recognition of a person’s dignity necessary, if they possess it regardless of it being recognized? 
In the end, Honneth opts for a version of the perception model:   
In our recognitional attitudes, we respond appropriately to evaluative qualities that, by 
the standards of our lifeworld, human subjects already possess but are actually available 
to them only once they can identify with them as a result of experiencing the recognition 
of these qualities (Honneth 2002: 510). 
This version of the perception model stresses the second-natural character of the attributes that 
we perceive and confirm in acts of recognition. Even though by the standards of our lifeworld 
humans are autonomous agents with moral responsibility, our acts of recognition, in affirming 
this fact, enable them to see themselves as such agents. This is in keeping with sociological 
insights. Even though the belief in human dignity is a cornerstone of Western modernity, 
people struggle to “live up” to it, to live dignified lives without forms of social recognition that 
public affirm their possession of dignity (Jütten [forthcoming]). 
 
Turning to the three dimensions of recognition, Honneth’s conception of love as a form of 
mutual recognition in the bourgeois family also poses challenges. Some critics have suggested 
that while he rejects the Rousseauian and Hegelian models of conjugal love as based on the 
complementarity of the male and female genders, The Struggle for Recognition does not have 
the resources to elaborate an alternative, egalitarian vision of conjugal love (Young 2007). 
Arguably, Freedom’s Right addresses this problem. To be sure, Honneth argues that conjugal 
love is a form of social freedom in which the lovers supplement and complete each other, but 
this completion does not presuppose the natural complementarity envisaged by Rousseau and 
Hegel. Rather, in conjugal love, “each person is a condition for the freedom of the other by 
becoming a source of physical self-experience for the other; each person’s natural being thus 
strips off its socially imposed constraints and recovers in the other a piece of his or her 
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individual freedom” (Honneth 2014: 151). On this account, lovers complement each other, 
because their intimacy creates shared experiences in which both feel completed. 
 
While love as a form of recognition (and social freedom) continues to attract critical 
attention (McNay 2015), the differentiation of legal respect and social esteem, and the 
transformation of social esteem in the capitalist recognition order have been the most 
innovative, but also the most controversial aspects of Honneth’s theory of recognition. 
 
Social Esteem, Self-Realization, and Solidarity 
The concept of a capitalist recognition order does not appear in The Struggle for Recognition. 
Honneth introduces it in his first contribution to his exchange with Nancy Fraser, 
Redistribution or Recognition? However, much of its conceptual background first appears in 
the earlier work when Honneth discusses the transformation of social esteem during the 
transition from Feudalism to capitalism. Social esteem enables individuals to relate positively 
to their own traits and abilities. It is a is a form of recognition that affirms the socially defined 
worth of their individual characteristics, that is, particular qualities which differentiate 
individuals from others. These qualities are worthy of esteem to the extent that they enable 
individuals to contribute to socially shared goals or values. This presupposes socially shared 
background assumption about what these goals or values are, and these assumptions clearly 
will be historically variable (Honneth 1996: 122). 
 
In particular, Honneth argues that in pre-modern estates-based societies such ethical goals 
and values are substantive and hierarchical. Society is stratified and assigns a different value 
to different social estates (e.g. the nobility, the clergy), corporations and guilds, according to 
their purported contribution to society and the specific style of life that characterizes 
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membership of these estates. Individuals gain social esteem, which here is conceived of as 
honor, to the extent that they fulfil the functions of their estate and live up to the socially 
expected standards defined by their membership of that estate. Social recognition between 
members of a given estate, corporation or guild is symmetrical, while relationships of 
recognition between members of different status groups are asymmetrical. Esteem is graded 
according to the hierarchy of the groups (Honneth 1996:123). As a result, individuals are not 
esteemed as individuals but as members of their status group.  
 
This system of recognition relations, which Honneth also calls corporative, comes under 
pressure when the cultural self-understanding of modernity begins to challenge the legitimacy 
of traditional hierarchies. This process splits traditional honor into three distinct valuations. 
First, legal respect becomes a separate form of social recognition and enshrines the equal moral 
standing of each individual in law. From now on, individuals are recognized as autonomous 
subjects, and this autonomy gives them their dignity as persons. Second, the aspect of honor 
that is concerned with personal conduct is privatized as subjectively defined “integrity.” It 
plays no further role in Honneth’s theory of recognition. Finally, social esteem comes to be the 
form of social recognition that bestows “prestige” or “standing” on individuals, and it becomes 
associated with their chosen form of self-realization through which they contribute to socially 
shared goals. Social status comes to track “achievement.” However, as Honneth recognizes, 
the problem with a recognition order that accords social esteem on the basis of individual 
achievement is that it presupposes a shared conception of social goals and a shared horizon of 
values which can be used to judge what counts as a contribution. But it is precisely this shared 
self-understanding that modern societies lack in the absence of the substantive ethical self-
understanding of traditional societies. Instead, modern societies are characterized by permanent 
cultural conflicts and struggles for recognition in which individuals fight for the recognition of 
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their particular achievements as contributions to socially shared goals (Honneth 1996: 126). 
Still, esteem recognition in modern societies odes require some agreement about socially 
shared goals. 
 
Honneth suggests that individual conceptions of self-realization come to take the place of 
a collective ethical self-understanding. The argument is that individuals contribute to socially 
shared goals through their individually chosen form of self-realization, and for that they are 
accorded social esteem (Honneth 1996: 126). Social worth is accorded to various forms of self-
realization, because modern societies recognize as worthy the particular ways in which 
individuals have chosen to live their lives. As a result, judgments about social esteem can be 
quite complex, because it is not always obvious or universally recognized that a particular form 
of self-realization contributes to socially shared goals. Moreover, individuals or social groups 
may engage in struggles for recognition in order to gain affirmation for their particular ways 
of life. In the case of successful struggles for recognition, the contribution of a particular form 
of self-realization to socially shared goals becomes recognized. At one point, Honneth gives 
the example of a “stay-at-home dad” in order to make this point. For a man to stay at home and 
raise his children only becomes a recognizable form of self-realization once it is no longer seen 
as a euphemism for unemployment and seen as a genuine contribution to socially shared goals 
(Anderson and Honneth 2005: 136). This example also reminds us that struggles for 
recognition often are necessary in order to break up traditional gendered norms about 
recognizable forms of self-realization.  
 
Honneth characterizes the form of social recognition expressed through social esteem as 
one of solidarity. This is intuitively plausible in pre-modern estates-based societies, where 
individuals are accorded symmetrical social esteem by their peers on the basis of their common 
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membership in an estate, corporation or guild and their shared value system. According to 
Honneth, in this context solidarity “can be understood as an interactive relationship in which 
subjects mutually sympathize with their various different ways of life because, among 
themselves, they esteem each other symmetrically” (Honneth 1996: 128). But how does 
solidarity arise in modern societies? Honneth’s answer is that in the absence of a shared 
substantive self-understanding, solidarity will arise to the extent that individuals recognize each 
other as individually valuable in the joint pursuit of socially shared goals. This affirmation of 
individual value is a state of solidarity, because gives self-esteem to the individual who is 
recognized. According to Honneth,  
Relationships of this sort can be said to be cases of ‘solidarity’, because they inspire 
not just passive tolerance but felt concern for what is individual and particular about 
the other person. For only to the degree to which I actively care for the development of 
the other’s characteristics (which seem foreign to me) can our shared goals be realized.   
(Honneth 1996: 129) 
Honneth wants to characterize this form of mutual recognition as symmetrical, too, although it 
seems clear that not every individual contributes equally to socially shared goals, and the value 
of any contribution is open to dispute. The symmetry of esteem recognition therefore consists 
in the fact that all individuals are free from collective denigration.  
 
This is a puzzling claim, and it becomes more puzzling when Honneth adds that given the 
form of solidarity described in the quote above, “individual competition for social esteem can 
then acquire a form free from pain,” because it is “not marred by experiences of disrespect” 
(Honneth 1996: 130). First, it is not clear what work the concept of solidarity does in Honneth’s 
account of social esteem in modern societies, and second, it is not clear how Honneth conceives 
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of the relationship between solidarity and competition. Let me expand on each of these two 
points in turn. 
 
As we have seen, in estates-based societies, individuals are bound together by bonds of 
solidarity, because they share a value system and a broad style of life, perhaps based on the 
ethos of their corporation or guild, even though Honneth makes clear that individuals may 
pursue various different ways of life within in the confines their shared ethical self-
understanding. The bonds in question are described appropriately as solidarity in the sense that 
they serve a unifying function that mediates between individual and society and ground 
positive duties between individuals (Scholz 2008: 18–20). In terms of Sally Scholz’s helpful 
typology, the form of solidarity is described appropriately as social, because it is a form of 
mutual dependency based on social cohesion and shared consciousness and experience which 
issues in the positive duties of individuals to help and support each other in day-to-day life. In 
particular, drawing on Durkheim’s famous distinction, it is a form of “mechanical” social 
solidarity in the sense that individuals are bound together by their similarity, rather than by 
their complementarity (Scholz 2008: 21–27). 
 
In contrast, in modern societies, individuals may pursue radically different ways of life 
based on highly individualized conceptions of the good. Nevertheless, Honneth must assume 
that individuals share at least some social goals, and solidarity is based on the recognition that 
different individuals through their chosen form of self-realization contribute to these socially 
shared goals. Thus, while modern social solidarity has a much weaker affective basis, it has a 
basis in the recognition of limited but significant shared interests that bind members of society 
together and give them reasons to help and support each other. In terms of Scholz’s typology, 
Honneth’s modern social solidarity therefore sits somewhere between, a weaker form of social 
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solidarity, which is “organic” rather than “mechanical,” in that individuals are bound together 
by their complementarity, rather than their similarity, and “civic solidarity,” which exists 
between members of a political state and protects individuals from vulnerabilities that would 
exclude them from participation in the civic public (Scholz 2008: 27). This form of solidarity 
is weaker, because instrumental and conditional. It is instrumental, because it establishes 
positive duties of help and support on the basis of mutual self-interest in the realization of 
socially shared values, rather than on affective ties and shared consciousness and experience, 
and therefore it is conditional on individuals being perceived as making a contribution to 
socially shared goals.  
 
It seems that the role of solidarity has shifted in the transition from pre-modern to modern 
societies. In the former, solidarity seemed to be the expression of social esteem. To be esteemed 
is to be included in social relations of solidarity. Solidarity is a medium of social esteem. In the 
latter, solidarity seems to be the background against which social esteem is distributed and 
pursued. Therefore, in modern societies, solidarity does not seem to be a medium of social 
esteem. As we shall see in the next section, in modern societies money, and in particular 
income, becomes the primary medium of esteem.  
 
This leads to the question of the relationship between solidarity and competition. Honneth 
suggests that the existence of this form of solidarity enables individuals in modern societies to 
compete for social esteem without fear of collective denigration. Solidarity expresses the 
socially shared conviction that individuals in society trough their chosen form of self-
realization typically do make a contribution to socially shared goals, even though they may do 
so to various degrees and with varying degrees of success. Against this background of “felt 
concern for what is individual and particular about the other person” (Honneth 1996:129), 
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individuals will be motivated to pursue socially shared goals in order to gain the social esteem 
of their peers, and thereby maximize the realization of these goals. But this optimistic 
conception of esteem competition as a mechanism that maximizes the realization of socially 
shared goals as if by invisible hand seems to overlook that competition also can undermine 
solidarity and lead to status hierarchies that embody precisely the denigration of ways of life 
that the theory of recognition criticizes. One reason for this is that social status is a positional 
good. Once social esteem is gradated, so that some individuals or groups are more esteemed 
than others, individuals or groups can improve their position in the status order either by 
increasing their own social esteem or by decreasing that of their peers. In such a competitive 
environment, we have no good reason to believe that everybody will be satisfied with basic 
social recognition as a contributor to socially shared goals. As a result, there will be a very 
strong stratification of social esteem in society, and social solidarity will come under severe 
pressure. Honneth’s analysis of the capitalist recognition order in Redistribution or 
Recognition? bears this out. For the concept of solidarity disappears from his analysis in that 
book. 
 
The Capitalist Recognition Order 
Honneth’s analysis of modern capitalism as a recognition order is one of the greatest 
achievements of his theory of recognition. To conceptualise society as a recognition order is to 
consider it as a normative order that institutionalizes the distribution of respect and social 
esteem and therefore expresses the social valuations that most people in this society see as 
legitimate. It is the normative horizon against which specific struggles for recognition take 
place (Honneth 2003a: 148–49). This analysis is innovative, because it offers conceptual tools 
for the moral evaluation of market societies which depart from established debates about 
distributive justice in liberal political philosophy and argues that misrecognition underlies 
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many of the injustices that individuals experience in the market economy. It is also a valuable 
addition to critical theories of capitalism in the Marxist tradition which analyze structures of 
oppression but do not have the conceptual tools to articulate how and why the oppressed 
experience their oppression as moral injury. However, Honneth’s analysis of capitalism also 
has been criticized for failing to explain all forms of injustice that individuals experience. This 
section will trace Honneth’s account of the emergence of the capitalist recognition order in 
some detail, before focusing on some of the criticisms. The next section will look at Nancy 
Fraser’s criticism of Honneth in her contributions to Redistribution or Recognition? 
 
Honneth begins with discussion in In Redistribution or Recognition? with a restatement of the 
history of the modern recognition order as the breaking up of the pre-modern “alloy of legal 
respect and social esteem – the moral fundament of all traditional societies” (Honneth 2003a: 
140). Like in The Struggle for Recognition, but in much more detail, Honneth next focuses on 
the basis of social esteem in modern capitalist societies. As we have seen, the neutral term for 
this basis is “individual achievement” (Honneth 2003a: 140). In particular, the capitalist 
recognition order valorizes “individual achievement within the structure of the industrially 
organized division of labor” (Honneth 2003a: 140). Social esteem is accorded to individuals 
on the basis of their success as productive citizens, and the implication is that esteem therefore 
has been meritocratized (Honneth 2003a: 141), so that what matters now is ability, effort or 
success, rather than social status conferred on the basis of birth, caste or class, that is, 
characteristics that individuals cannot deserve or be responsible for.  
 
As we have seen in our bird’s eye view of Honneth’s theory of recognition, his discussion 
of the capitalist recognition order in Redistribution or Recognition? aims to paint a realistic 
picture of modern capitalist societies. Honneth acknowledges that these societies were 
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“hierarchically organized in an unambiguously ideological way from the start” (Honneth 
2003a: 141). In terms of the recognition-theoretical framework this means that what counts as 
“achievement” was always already skewed in favor of the independent, male, middle-class 
bourgeois, and this ideological bias has survived until today. As a result, a specific model of 
individual achievement, “investment in intellectual preparation for a specific activity” 
(Honneth 2003a: 147), which is paradigmatically realized in entrepreneurship and the 
professions, still dominates the capitalist recognition order, while many other contributions to 
socially shared goals are under-valued. This includes manual and repetitive forms of labor 
performed by dependent working-class laborers and many forms of care and house work 
primarily performed by women. 
 
To be sure, Honneth’s discussion of the capitalist recognition order in Redistribution or 
Recognition? does not offer a justification of the ideology underpinning this order. Rather, it 
serves the twin aim of explaining the legitimacy of capitalism in the eyes of modern subjects 
and of showing that there are immanent resources in the capitalist recognition order that justify 
criticism of that order. According to Honneth, capitalism is not “norm-free”, a position often 
ascribed to Habermas, but rather governed by normative principles, namely, principles of social 
recognition, even though the specific recognition principles and their application frequently are 
contested (Honneth 2003a: 142). Consider the labor market. People often appeal to the 
normative vocabulary of desert or merit in order to articulate their claims for better working 
conditions or better pay. But labour markets are complex social institutions in which 
“efficiency considerations…are inextricably fused with cultural views of the social world” 
(Honneth 2003a: 156), which determine the social value of a particular job or profession.  Until 
recently, in modern capitalist societies labour markets were tightly regulated, and these 
regulations expressed these societies’ understandings of desert and justice and of the specific 
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vulnerabilities to which workers are exposed. These immanent norms go some way toward 
explaining why people see capitalism as legitimate, but they also explain why people feel 
justified in criticizing it when it falls short of its immanent promise, the surplus of validity that 
all norms contain (Honneth 2003a: 186).   
 
This account of the capitalist recognition order suggests that struggles for recognition in 
the sphere of social esteem which appeal to social solidarity, including struggles for social-
welfare benefits for the unemployed, but also for better working conditions, can be transformed 
into struggles about social rights, so that unemployment benefits and decent working 
conditions are no longer seen as expressions of esteem for the social contribution of workers 
but of respect for their equal rights (Honneth 2003a: 149). In fact, Honneth conceives of this 
boundary-shifting between recognition spheres as a form of moral progress, because it 
decouples social rights from the need for justification in terms of individual achievement 
(Honneth 2003a: 188). This seems right, because the legal guarantee of social-welfare 
entitlements establishes the social minimum as something that one is due as everyone’s equal, 
rather than as a social inferior. However, Honneth also notes that the demonization of the 
unemployed as skivers and the attempts to curtail their social rights are obvious examples of 
the erosion of respect based on a prior erosion of social esteem. The “social stigma” (Honneth 
2010b:224) of unemployment cuts across respect and esteem recognition. Once a class of 
individuals is characterised as useless and replaceable and therefore not worthy of social 
esteem, their ability to exact the equal respect that is due to them as citizens in the form of 
social rights is undermined, too (Honneth and Stahl 2013: 283). 
 
This points to an important insight of Honneth’s theory of recognition. Once social esteem 
becomes a necessary condition for individual self-realization, the ability to be recognized as 
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making a contribution to socially shared goals, in other words, the ability to be recognized as 
useful to others, becomes of the upmost importance. In the capitalist recognition order, most 
individuals demonstrate their usefulness through work, organized in the social division of 
labor. But not everyone can or does make a contribution to socially shared goals, and not 
everyone can develop such ability to the same degree. As a result, the capitalist recognition 
order issues in a social status order in which social esteem is unequally distributed between 
people. This would be true, even if this order were to track genuine social contributions and to 
reward genuine achievements. In reality, where the capitalist recognition order is ideologically 
distorted and one-sided, the distribution of social esteem reproduces and legitimizes the 
existing hierarchies of social class and prestige. And in such a hierarchical class society, many 




In her contributions to Redistribution or Recognition? Nancy Fraser puts forward a number of 
objections of Honneth’s conception the capitalist recognition order (Fraser 2003a; Fraser 
2003b). Perhaps the most influential objection is directed at Honneth’s “monism,” that is, his 
view that struggles for redistribution can be reduced to struggles for recognition. Fraser uses 
the example of an industrial worker who loses his job because of an industrial merger (Fraser 
2003a: 35). The loss of his job cannot be explained meaningfully by a re-evaluation of his 
achievement or contribution to socially shared goals. Rather, it must be explained by reference 
to political-economic factors that operate at the systemic level of the market economy and are 
governed by profitability considerations (Fraser 2003b: 215). The upshot of this example is 
that there is an entire dimension of capitalism that the theory of recognition does not capture, 
and therefore the recognition-theoretical analysis of capitalism is incomplete. Fraser’s 
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alternative is an explanatory dualism, according to which individuals can suffer from 
maldistribution, misrecognition, or both, and neither can be reduced to the other (Fraser 2003a: 
34–37). 
 
In response, Honneth could suggest a “weak” reading of his argument (Zurn 2015: 140), 
according to which the capitalist recognition order is one of several causal determinants of 
market outcomes, which derives its force from the fact that the functioning of the market has 
recognitional preconditions. The market depends on laws, social norms, psychological 
dispositions and particular self-relationships of actors which could be withdrawn if people no 
longer believed that the market is a legitimate sphere of social recognition. The problem with 
this weak version of the argument may be that it is too abstract to offer explanations of specific 
economic problems or guide emancipatory politics (Zurn 2015: 145).  
 
For better or for worse, Honneth seems to move in the direction of a weaker argument, 
which stresses the fact that economic action is embedded in a moral framework. In his most 
recent discussion of the market economy in Freedom’s Right, Honneth returns to the language 
of solidarity in order to make this point:   
[T]he market can only fulfill its function of harmoniously integrating individual 
economic activities in an unforced manner and by means of contractual relations if it is 
embedded in feelings of solidarity that precede all contracts and obligate economic 
actors to treat each other fairly and justly. (Honneth 2014: 181) 
Of course, it remains unclear what exactly the relationship is between solidarity, fairness, and 
justice on the one hand, and individual economic action, which is self-interested by definition 
(although it may include a concern for others’ welfare), on the other. If it turns out that fairness 
and justice are compatible with the economic choices that have put Fraser’s industrial worker 
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out of a job, then the solidarity underpinning these norms must be very weak. Otherwise, we 
would expect such job losses to be accompanied by very substantial forms of compensation, 
redeployment or retraining, which would reassure the workers of their continued worth in the 
eyes of their fellow citizens. But if it turns out that fairness and justice are incompatible with 
it, then we have strong reasons to believe that solidarity, fairness and justice, in fact, are not 
immanent norms of the market economy (Jütten 2015). To be sure, some norms of fairness and 
justice may be operative in market economies, because they are demanded by respect for the 
autonomy and dignity of individuals, but they are not based on the solidarity that individuals 
owe to each other, because they recognize each other as making a contribution to socially 
shared goals.  
 
Conclusion: Looking Forward 
Honneth’s theory of recognition offers a unique perspective on modern capitalist societies. Its 
focus on mutual recognition as a necessary condition of individual self-realization reveals 
forms of disrespect and humiliation to be deeply political phenomena that form the experiential 
basis of social struggles for recognition and resistance against many forms of material and 
symbolic domination. At the same time, as we have seen, some basic questions about the 
explanatory power of recognition remain contested, especially in the sphere of the market 
economy. At the same time, Honneth has taken the lead in using the recognition-theoretical 
framework in order to offer re-interpretations of both philosophical concepts and social 
phenomena. For example, he has developed a recognition-theoretical re-conception of ideology 
(Honneth 2007b) and an account of the decline of normative conceptions of work and the labor 
market (Honneth 2010b). It would be interesting to see the theory of recognition used in other 
areas of social and political thought. 
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One obvious area for development is Feminist philosophy. As we have seen, Honneth has 
been very interested in gender from the beginning, and his treatment of love and the family has 
led to many debates among and with Feminists. The question of whether Feminists ought to 
advocate the recognition of childcare and housework as work that should be recognized 
through payment, is a good example of this (Rössler 2007). However, there are other questions 
in Feminist philosophy which may profit from a recognition-theoretical perspective. For 
example, sexual objectification could be analyzed fruitfully as a form of ideological 
recognition or misrecognition. Likewise, more work could be done on the persistent “hidden 
injuries of class” (Sennett and Cobb 1972) that manifest themselves as a lack of social 
recognition (Jütten [forthcoming]). One expected pay-off of such work would be the further 
conceptual specification of the phenomenon of misrecognition through its application to 
specific social issues. It is a strength of the recognition-theoretical approach that it is able to 
disclose forms of social suffering that are difficult to capture in the language used by liberal 
theories of justice. The enduring legacy of this latest shift in Frankfurt School critical theory 
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